Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players, and let R N be a profile of linear orders on A of the players. Let u N be a profile of utility functions for R N . We define the nontransferable utility (NTU) game V u N that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m ≤ 3, and it may be empty for m ≥ 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m ≤ 5, and it may be empty for m ≥ 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-fold replication of R N is nonempty, provided that k ≥ n + 2. 1. Introduction. Mas-Colell [15] has introduced a bargaining set that is also defined for finite games. Although the existence problem was settled for certain classes of games, it remained notoriously open for the important class of finite superadditive NTU games. In Peleg and Sudhölter [17] this fundamental question was answered in the negative, by showing that there exists a four-person NTU majority voting game with 10 alternatives, whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty. We note that majority voting games are superadditive. That example has led naturally to the following two questions:
1. Introduction. Mas-Colell [15] has introduced a bargaining set that is also defined for finite games. Although the existence problem was settled for certain classes of games, it remained notoriously open for the important class of finite superadditive NTU games. In Peleg and Sudhölter [17] this fundamental question was answered in the negative, by showing that there exists a four-person NTU majority voting game with 10 alternatives, whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty. We note that majority voting games are superadditive. That example has led naturally to the following two questions:
(i) What is the minimum number of alternatives for which there exists an NTU majority voting game with an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set?
(ii) Is it possible to find an NTU majority voting game with an odd number of players, whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty?
We have investigated the foregoing two problems. In the following paragraphs we present our solutions and comment on their importance.
In Theorem 5.1 we prove that for all NTU majority voting games with at most five alternatives, the Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty. Furthermore, Example 5.1 provides a four-person NTU majority voting game with six alternatives and an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set. Thus, we have a complete solution to the first question.
Let A be a set of m alternatives, m ∈ 3 4 5 , and let N be a set of (an odd number of) voters. To choose one alternative out of A by the majority rule we need to construct a binary voting tree (see Banks [7] ). This is an ad hoc procedure. If we focus on a particular binary voting tree, then the final outcome may be sensitive to the chosen agenda. In contrast, the Mas-Colell bargaining set indicates for each profile of linear orders the choice of at least one compromise alternative. Furthermore, it is neutral with respect to the alternatives and works for an even number of voters as well. Because choice problems with at most five alternatives are quite frequent, Theorem 5.1 may be quite useful.
We now turn to the second question, whether or not there is an NTU majority voting game with an odd number of players and an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set. Unfortunately, it is shown in §6 that the answer is positive. However, the very sophisticated proof is innovative and may be helpful in future investigations of NTU games.
A few remarks are in order about the modelling of a social choice problem as an NTU game. Whereas in the social choice setting preferences over the set A of alternatives are ordinal, we represent them by a cardinal utility function in order to pass to utility space, the natural realm of NTU games. This by itself is innocuous. For everything considered in this paper, the numbers that appear in a payoff vector of the NTU game do not matter in themselves; only the ordinal comparisons between them and the utility values of the alternatives matter. In this sense, our analysis is purely ordinal. What may seem more problematic is our assumption of free disposal of utility. That is, a payoff vector is considered feasible in the NTU game that is associated with the social choice problem not only if it corresponds, via the utility representation, to some alternative in A, but also if it is obtained from such a vector by arbitrarily reducing some of its entries. This is necessary in order to satisfy the comprehensiveness property of NTU games, and is in fact common practice in applications of NTU games (see, e.g., Scarf [18] , Aumann [4] ). Indeed, our positive results depend significantly on this feature: In many instances where we point out a payoff vector in the bargaining set, this vector entails the choice of an alternative in A, accompanied by a reduction of the utilities of some (but not all, as we insist on weak Pareto optimality) of the players. 1 2 To interpret such outcomes in the social choice context, one can think of voters who contribute to the electoral campaign of a candidate in order to secure his election. Our results indicate that such contributions are often essential to the stability (in the sense of the bargaining set) of the outcome. Note that most legal systems allow campaign contributions, but do not allow the transfer of payments to voters. This lends support to both the free disposal of utility and the nontransferability of utility that are inherent in the NTU model.
We now comment on the relevance of bargaining sets to our model. A feasible payoff vector x is in the core if no coalition has a profitable deviation from (objection against) x. An objection y against x is justified, roughly, if there is no objection to y also taking into consideration payoffs at x. The payoff vector x is in the Mas-Colell [15] bargaining set if there exist no justified objections against it. Thus, the Mas-Colell bargaining set focuses on credibility of objections, and it is a natural extension of the core. It was introduced as a variant of the more classical Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set, which is defined similarly (with different notions of objections and counterobjections 3 ) . It is natural to study the analogues of the questions above also for the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set, and indeed we do so in this paper (the answers turn out to be easier). There are several other variants of the definition of the bargaining set that we do not study here. We briefly mention two of them. Asscher [2] presented an ordinal bargaining set for NTU games. However, an element of the Asscher bargaining set allows the existence of justified objections. (Its definition uses the transitive closure of the binary relation "Player i has a justified objection against Player j.") Finally, the consistent bargaining set of Dutta et al. [9] is a subset of the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Therefore, it cannot yield wider existence results. Furthermore, it may be empty even for transferable utility (TU) games.
The starting point of many studies in social choice theory is the voting paradox, which arises when every alternative is dominated by some other alternative according to a majority of voters. This phenomenon is equivalent, in terms of the NTU majority voting game, to the emptiness of the core. As explained above, the bargaining sets represent a weaker notion of stability than the core, because they take into account only justified objections. Thus, our study of the bargaining sets of majority voting games determines the extent to which focusing on credible objections restores the existence of stable outcomes to the social choice problem, albeit in a weaker sense. Our negative results, such as the construction of an NTU majority voting game with six or more alternatives, which has an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set, may be viewed as showing the robustness of the voting paradox to this weakening of the stability requirements. Note that in this context the assumption of free disposal of utility discussed above only makes our negative results stronger: The robustness of the voting paradox is still exhibited when the outcome space is enlarged by allowing free disposal of utility.
We shall now review our results. In §2 we derive the exact form of the cooperative NTU games that correspond to simple majority voting. 4 We start with a game in strategic form and use the standard procedure of Aumann and Peleg [6] to derive our NTU game. We also recall the definitions of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets of cooperative NTU games.
1 See a discussion of this in a concrete example in §3. 2 In extreme cases, the utilities are reduced down to the minimal utility level (over A) of the players. This admittedly weakens the positive value of the existence results. Still, on the positive side, we draw attention to Theorem 7.2, which shows that typically (in a suitable probabilistic sense), when there are many players, a positive fraction of the players may receive their maximal utility level in the Mas-Colell bargaining set.
The voting paradox with three voters and three alternatives is analyzed in §3 with respect to these two bargaining sets. It turns out that both bargaining sets are nonempty.
Section 4 addresses the existence question for the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set of a simple majority voting game. We show that it is nonempty when there are at most three alternatives, but may be empty when there are four or more alternatives even if there are just three voters.
Section 5 is devoted to the solution of the first question. The boundary between existence and nonexistence turns out to be somewhat higher in the case of the Mas-Colell bargaining set: As indicated above, we prove existence for up to five alternatives, and give examples of emptiness for six or more alternatives.
In these examples, there is an even number of voters. The second question is addressed in §6. By an elaborate construction using huge numbers of voters and alternatives, it is shown that there exists an NTU majority voting game with an odd number of voters and an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set.
We conclude in §7 with existence results for two models in which there are many voters, whose preferences are drawn in a specified way. In one of them, a simple probabilistic model, we show that both bargaining sets are nonempty, with probability tending to one as the number of voters tends to infinity. In the other, a replication model, we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for any k-fold replication with k sufficiently large, whereas the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set may be empty for any k. 
Preliminaries
S , and y ≤ x implies that y ∈ C. An NTU game with the player set N is a pair N V where V is a function that associates with every coalition S (that is, S ⊆ N and S = ) a set V S ⊆ S , V S = , such that (i) V S is closed and comprehensive; (ii) V S ∩ x + S + is bounded for every x ∈ S . We shall now assume that each i ∈ N has a linear order R i on A. Thus, for every i ∈ N , R i is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on A. Moreover, let u i , i ∈ N , be a utility function that represents R i . We shall always assume that min
Let u N = u i i∈N be a utility profile that satisfies (1). We consider the strategic game in which every player votes for some alternative in A. If a strict majority of voters agrees on ∈ A, then the outcome is , and every voter i gets utility u i . Otherwise, if no majority forms, a deadlock results and every voter gets utility zero. These rules associate with every strategy profile i i∈N ∈ A N and every player k ∈ N a utility (or payoff) that we denote by v k i i∈N . We shall now recall the notion of -effectiveness (see Aumann and Peleg [6] and Aumann [3] ). Every coalition S, = S ⊆ N , may adopt any strategy profile i i∈S ∈ A S by a binding agreement and, hence, S may guarantee x ∈ S , that is, S is -effective 5 for x, if there exists a i i∈S ∈ A S such that, for every strategy profile
S is -effective for x . The NTU game N V u N associated with choice by simple majority voting is called the simple majority voting game (see Aumann [4] ). Let S be a coalition and i ∈ S. If S ≤ n/2 and if all members of N \S select i's worst alternative, then S cannot guarantee any positive payoff to player i, because it is not possible to reach a majority for any but i's worst alternative. If S > n/2 and if each member of S selects the same alternative ∈ A, then S guarantees u i to any i ∈ S. Thus,
where u S = u i i∈S . It should be noted that there also exists the notion of -effectiveness: A coalition S is -effective for x ∈ S if, for each strategy profile of N \S, there exists a strategy profile of S such that k's payoff is at least x k for all k ∈ S. A careful inspection of the foregoing reasoning shows that -effectiveness again leads to the same NTU game N V u N in our case. 
We shall say that an alternative ∈ A is a weak Condorcet winner (with respect to R N ) if
It should be remarked that the NTU games defined by (2) and (3) are zero normalized and superadditive. Now we shall recall the definitions of two bargaining sets introduced by Davis and Maschler [8] and by Mas-Colell [15] , following the general approach delineated by Aumann and Maschler [5] . Let N V be a zero-normalized NTU game and x ∈ N . We say that x is • an imputation if x is an individually rational preimputation. We also use the natural analogue of the Pareto optimality notion with respect to V S , where = S ⊆ N .
A pair P y is an objection at x if = P ⊆ N , y is Pareto optimal in V P , and y > x P . An objection P y is strong if y x P . The pair Q z is a weak counterobjection to the objection
A strong objection P y is justified in the sense of the bargaining set if there exist players k ∈ P and l ∈ N \P such that there does not exist any weak counterobjection Q z to P y satisfying l ∈ Q and k Q. The bargaining set of N V , N V , is the set of all imputations x that do not have strong justified objections at x in the sense of the bargaining set (see Davis and Maschler [8] ). An objection P y is justified in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set if there does not exist any counterobjection to P y . The Mas-Colell bargaining set of N V , N V , is the set of all imputations x that do not have a justified objection at x in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (see Mas-Colell [15] ).
Remark 2.1. We recall that x ∈ N is in the core of the NTU game N V , N V , if x ∈ V N and for any coalition S and any y ∈ V S there exists i ∈ S such that x i ≥ y i . (i) Note that N V ⊆ N V Indeed, x ∈ N V is weakly Pareto optimal, individually rational, and it has no strong objection.
(ii) The Mas-Colell bargaining set need not contain the core (see the following example). Still, the MasColell bargaining set of a simple majority voting game must contain a core element if the core is nonempty. To 
We conclude that if a simple majority voting game has a nonempty core, then its Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and its Mas-Colell bargaining set are nonempty as well.
Example 2.1. Let n = 4 and let R N be given by Table 1 .
N a is a justified objection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set at x. Remark 2.2. The original definition of Mas-Colell considered preimputations, not just imputations. In restricting our attention to imputations, we follow Vohra [21] . In any case, all our results about existence and nonexistence are valid for both variants of the definition. Table 1 . Preference profile of a four-person voting problem. Table 2 . Preference profile of the 3 × 3 voting paradox.
Remark 2.3. For a given R N ∈ L N , the particular choice of a representation u N ∈ R N is essentially immaterial: Different representations lead to NTU games that are derived from each other by ordinal transformations, and so are their bargaining sets.
3. The 3 × 3 voting paradox. In this section we shall compute the bargaining sets of the voting paradox of three voters and three alternatives and interpret the results.
Let A = a b c , let n = 3, and let R N ∈ L N be given by Table 2 . For i ∈ N , let u i be a utility representation of R i satisfying (1) and let V = V u N (see (2) and (3)). We claim that N V = 0 . Indeed, it is straightforward to verify that 0 ∈ N V . To show the opposite inclusion, let x ∈ N V . Then there exists ∈ A such that x ≤ u N . Without loss of generality, we may assume that = a. Assume, on the contrary, that x > 0. If
c is a justified objection of 3 against 1 at x in the sense of the bargaining set. If x 1 = 0 and, hence,
To compute the Mas-Colell bargaining set, we define x = u 1 b u 2 a 0 and claim that x ∈ N V . Indeed, let P y be an objection at x. Then P ≥ 2. Because y is Pareto optimal in V P , y ∈ u P ∈ A . If y = u P a , then P y is countered by 2 3 u 2 3 c . If y = u P b , then y > x P implies that P = 1 3 . In this case P y is countered by 1 2 u 1 2 a . Finally, if y = u P c , then y > x P implies that P = 2 3 and that P y is countered by 1 3 u 1 3 b . In order to show that everyx ∈ N satisfying 0 ≤x ≤ x is an element of N V , it should be noted that each objection atx is also an objection at x ifx 1 > 0 andx 2 > 0. Ifx 1 = 0 andx 2 > 0, then the additional objections are of the form P u P c for some P ⊆ N and these objections can be countered by 1 3 u 1 3 b . Similarly, ifx 1 > 0 andx 2 = 0, then the additional objections can be countered by 1 2 u 1 2 a . Finally, ifx = 0, then each additional objection can be countered by one of the foregoing pairs 1 3 u 1 3 b or 1 2 u 1 2 a . Similarly, for y = u 1 b 0 u 3 c and z = 0 u 2 a u 3 c we have that everyŷ ∈ N satisfying 0 ≤ŷ ≤ y and everyẑ ∈ N satisfying 0 ≤ẑ ≤ z is in N V . We shall now show that there are no other elements in N V . Indeed, any remaining individually rational x ∈ V N must have a coordinate that is higher than the utility of that voter's second-best alternative. Say, without loss of generality, that
c is a justified objection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set at x. We conclude that N V is the intersection of N + and the comprehensive hull of x y z .
Discussion: The singleton N V tells us that in order to achieve (coalitional) stability the players have to give up any profit above their individually protected levels of utility. There is no hint how an alternative of A will be chosen. The message of N V is much more detailed. For example, the element x = u 1 b u 2 a 0 tells us that the alternative a may be chosen provided player 1 disposes of u 1 a − u 1 b utiles. Thus, we also see here that lower utility levels guarantee stability. Actually, x implies that there is an agreement between players 1 and 2, the alternative a is chosen as a result of the agreement, and the utility of 1 is reduced (because of the agreement) from u 1 a to u 1 b . Note that cooperative game theory does not specify the details of agreements that support stable payoff vectors.
In this example (and indeed in many other examples), the Mas-Colell bargaining set is much larger than the Aumann-Davis-Maschler one. However, it is interesting to note that N V need not contain N V in general, as can be concluded from Remark 2.1 and Example 2.1. Nevertheless, it can be shown that when the number of alternatives is three and there is no weak Condorcet winner, then in the associated NTU game N V we have N V ⊆ N V .
6 Table 3 . Preference profile of a 4-alternative voting problem. (2) and (3)).
Proof. If there exists a weak Condorcet winner ∈ A, then u N ∈ N V . Therefore, we may assume that A = 3 and for every ∈ A there exists ∈ A such that . We claim that for any ∈ A there exists i ∈ N such that t 3 
> n/2 and is a Condorcet winner that was excluded. We conclude that 0 ∈ N is weakly Pareto optimal. As any objection P y at 0 has the weak counterobjection l 0 for any l ∈ N \P , we conclude that 0 ∈ N V . Example 4.1. Let A = a b c d , let n = 3, and let R N be given by Table 3 . We claim that N V = . Let x be an imputation of N V . In order to show that x N V , we may assume without loss of generality that
We distinguish the following possibilities:
c is a justified objection (in the sense of the bargaining set) of 3 against 1.
( 
and note that N V = . More interestingly, Example 4.1 can be generalized to yield an empty bargaining set for simple majority voting games on four alternatives with infinitely many numbers of voters.
Example 4.2 (Example 4.1 Generalized). Let
Then N V = . Indeed, k = 1 coincides with Example 4.1. The reader may check, e.g., the case k = 2 (see Table 4 ) by repeating the arguments of Example 4.1. Table 4 . Preference profile for k = 2.
5. The Mas-Colell bargaining set. We shall show that is nonempty for any simple majority voting game on less than six alternatives. Also, we shall show that there is a simple majority voting game on six alternatives whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty. We shall always assume that R N ∈ L A N , = R N , u N ∈ R N , and V = V u N . We start with the following simple lemma. Proof. If A ≤ 3, the proof that we gave for (Theorem 4.1) also works for . In order to prove the theorem for m = 4, we may assume that there is no weak Condorcet winner. Then, for each ∈ A,
Indeed, if for some ∈ A, ∈ t 1 R i t 2 R i for all i ∈ N , then implies that is a Condorcet winner that was excluded. For ∈ A, define x = min u i u i t 3 R i i∈N By Lemma 5.1, x ∈ N V , if x is weakly Pareto optimal. Hence, in order to complete the proof for m = 4, it suffices to show that there exists ∈ A such that x is weakly Pareto optimal. Two possibilities may occur: If there exists ∈ A such that = t 4 R i for all i ∈ N , then by (4), x is weakly Pareto optimal. Otherwise, any x is weakly Pareto optimal. Now, let m = 5, let A = a 1 a 5 , and assume that N V = . Then, for each ∈ A (i) there exists ∈ A such that ; (ii) u N is Pareto optimal (because is nonempty when we restrict our attention to the game corresponding to the restriction of u N to A\ ).
(1) l min ≥ 4: Then there exists a weakly Pareto optimal x ∈ V N such that
for all i ∈ N , which is impossible by Lemma 5.1.
(2) l min ≤ 2: Let ∈ A such that l = l min and . Then is a Condorcet winner, which is impossible by (i). is not a counterobjection, we conclude that k ∈ T , t 4 R k = , and t 5 R k = . We conclude that for any k ∈Ŝ the alternative t 5 R k is only dominated by t 4 R k . If n is odd, we may now easily finish the proof by the observation that dominates all other alternatives except , and therefore min u i u i i∈N ∈ N V . Hence, we may assume from now on that n is an even number.
Thus, there exists j ∈Ŝ such that t 1 R j = and t 2 R j = . So far, we have for any k ∈Ŝ, where
is only dominated by (5) there exists j ∈Ŝ such that
Now, let k j ∈Ŝ have the foregoing properties-let us say k = 1 and j = 2. We also may assume that t 4 R 1 = a 4 , 5 a 3 a 1 a 2 ) . Therefore, for any k ∈Ŝ, we have
Mathematics
We are now going to show that there exists k ∈Ŝ such that 4 . Therefore, our claim has been shown. So far we have deduced that there exist k j ∈Ŝ, j = 1 2 4 5, such that t 5 R k j = a j . By (7), i ∈ N u i a j > u i a 3 ≥ n/2 for all j = 1 2 4 5 We conclude that a 3 = t 3 R i for all i ∈ N and i ∈ N u i a j > u i a 3 = n/2 for all j = 1 2 4 5 Therefore, a 3 is not dominated by any alternative, which contradicts (i).
We shall now present an example of a simple majority voting game on six alternatives, whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty.
Example 5.1. Let n = 4, A = a 1 a 4 b c , and let R N ∈ L N be given by Table 5 . We claim that N V = . Note that the proof below is similar to the proof of the emptiness of an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a game derived from a four-person voting problem on 10 alternatives (see Peleg and Sudhölter [17, §3] ).
Proof of the Claim. Assume that there exists x ∈ N V . Let ∈ A such that x ≤ u N . Let
We distinguish the following possibilities: (i) x ≤ u N a 1 . In this case, S 4 u S 4 a 4 is an objection at x. Because there must be a counterobjection to this, we conclude that S 3 u S 3 a 3 is a counterobjection, and therefore also an objection at x. Hence,
To this objection, too, there must be a counterobjection. We conclude that S 2 u S 2 a 2 is a counterobjection. Hence, x 2 ≤ u 2 a 2 , and therefore x u N b and the desired contradiction has been obtained in this case.
(ii) The possibilities x ≤ u N for ∈ a 2 a 3 a 4 may be treated similarly. 
6. The Mas-Colell bargaining set for an odd number of voters. The examples that we just gave for emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set have an even number of voters. The most natural setting for simple majority rule is when the number of voters is odd. It is therefore desirable to study the existence question for in the class of simple majority voting games with an odd number of voters. Attempts to construct small explicit counterexamples, similar to those above, seem to fail. We take a different approach that leads to the construction of a profile of preferences with an odd number of voters, whose associated simple majority voting game has an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set.
Throughout this section we shall always assume that A is a finite set of m ≥ 2 alternatives and that N = 1 n for some odd n ∈ . Recall that T = A is a tournament on A if is an irreflexive, asymmetric, and complete relation on A (that is, ∈ A = implies that exactly one of , holds). As our construction is complex and is done in several steps, we first give an outline. One can associate with every profile of linear orders R N a tournament T = A , where = R N is the domination relation. For a profile R N , we can look at any given choice = i i∈N of an alternative for each voter (we call this a position) and ask if the corresponding vector of utility levels has no justified objection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set. The first idea of the construction is to work with profiles R N that are tight, in the sense that the contest between any two alternatives is decided by a one-vote difference. Under this assumption, the above condition on a position (there being no justified objection) has a relatively simple expression in terms of the profile R N and the tournament T ; we call such nonenhancing. As a first step we show that tightness does not restrict in any way the tournaments that can be realized. Recall that McGarvey [16] proved that every tournament may be obtained as the domination relation R N of some profile of preferences R N . Our Lemma 6.1 strengthens this result by insisting that R N be tight. 7 The second idea of the construction is to force the Mas-Colell bargaining set to be empty by inserting above every would-be element of it, i.e., every nonenhancing position , a new alternative * that will render (or more precisely, the corresponding payoff vector) nonweakly Pareto optimal. Of course, there is a danger that by doing this we introduce new candidates for belonging to . It turns out that we can avoid this if in the original profile (before the new alternatives are inserted) the following holds true: For every nonenhancing position = i i∈N and every alternative , a majority of voters i ∈ N prefer to i .
Most of the work is devoted to constructing the original profile so as to guarantee this property. First, we choose the tournament. Lemma 6.2 asserts that we can choose it so that every alternative beats exactly half of the other alternatives, and it never happens that all the alternatives that beat a given alternative are in turn beaten by (or equal to) another alternative. Its proof uses a known construction of quadratic residue tournaments. 8 Lemma 6.4 asserts, essentially, that if the tournament is chosen as in Lemma 6.2, and if every linear order appears in the profile approximately n/m! times, then the profile has the desired property. The proof of Lemma 6.4 is based on some calculations of the relative frequency of linear orders that display certain patterns, which we carry out in advance of the lemma. These calculations, and the lemma itself, are conveniently expressed in terms of the uniform probability measure on L A , but the method of proof is not probabilistic.
Finally, we have to construct the profile so that it will satisfy the premises of Lemma 6.4. It needs to have a prescribed associated tournament, and at the same time be approximately uniform in terms of the number of appearances of each linear order. We achieve this by building the profile in two parts with disjoint sets of voters. The first part, produced by Lemma 6.1, realizes the prescribed tournament. The second part is uniform (and hence does not affect the tournament), and is chosen large enough so that the overall profile is sufficiently close to being uniform.
We proceed with the details. 7 Incidentally, the smallest number of voters n that is needed for McGarvey's theorem (as a function of m) has been studied in the literature.
McGarvey's original proof (which also permitted us to prescribe ties between pairs of alternatives) required n = m m − 1 , and subsequent research (see Stearns [20] and Erdős and Moser [10] ) has shown that n = O m/log m suffices and is the right order of magnitude. Our proof requires n = 2m − 3.
8 Quadratic residue tournaments have been used in the combinatorial literature as examples of explicitly constructed tournaments that display randomlike properties. See, e.g., Graham and Spencer [12] and Alon and Spencer [1] . Table 6 . Sketch of a profile R N . 
Let n = n 0 + 2, B = ∈ A 0 0 , and let R 0 ∈ L A 0 such that, for all ∈ B and all ∈ A 0 \B, R 0 . Put k 0 = A 0 \B . Moreover, let R * 0 be the reverse linear order of R 0 . Now, define R i ∈ L A for all i ∈ N as follows (see Table 6 ).
If i ≤ n 0 + 1 /2, then let R i be the linear order that coincides with R i 0 on A 0 and ranks 0 first, that is, 
For all ∈ A and ∈ A − there exists ∈ A − \ such that (15) Proof. The set Q = p ∈ p is a prime such that p ≡ 3 mod 4 is infinite. Let p ∈ Q, p > 3. Let p = 0 p − 1 denote the field of residue classes modulo p. Recall that an element t ∈ p \ 0 is called a quadratic residue modulo p if there exists a ∈ p such that a 2 ≡ t mod p (for the basic properties of quadratic residues that we use below, see, e.g., Hardy and Wright [13, Chapter VI] ). Let A = p and let on A be defined by iff ∈ A and − is a quadratic residue modulo p. It suffices to prove that A satisfies the desired properties.
The fact that A is a tournament that satisfies property (13) is an immediate consequence of the following claim.
Claim 1. The set of quadratic residues mod p contains exactly one element of every set t p − t for every t ∈ A\ 0 .
Assume the contrary. Because there are p − 1 /2 quadratic residues mod p, there exists t ∈ A\ 0 such that t and p − t are both quadratic residues. Therefore, there are a b ∈ A such that a 2 ≡ t mod p and
Because p ≡ 3 mod 4, p − 1 /2 is odd and, hence, ac p−1 ≡ −1 mod p. On the other hand, by Fermat's theorem, ac p−1 ≡ 1 mod p and the desired contradiction has been obtained.
The following claim enables us to show that (14) and (15) We conclude that 3s ≡ 0 mod p. As p > 3, s ≡ 0 mod p. In order to show (14) 
Indeed, we may assume that
and, hence, (16) is true. Lemma 6.3. Let t ∈ such that t ≥ 0 and 2t + 1 ≤ m. Let r r ∈ A, r = 1 t, be 2t + 1 distinct elements and define for any r = 0 t,
Then c 0 = 0, and
Proof. Clearly c 0 = 0. Let r ∈ 1 t . We may assume that m = 2r + 1. There are 2 r − 1 /2 r m − 1 ! preferences R ∈ L A with the properties that t 1 R = and that k R k for some k = 1 r. Also, for every k = 1 r, there are m − 1 c r−1 m − 2 ! preferences R ∈ L A such that t 1 R = k and R l R l for some l ∈ 1 r \ k , because the rank of k is any element of 2 m. The same number of preferences occurs if k is ranked first. We conclude that there are (17) (13)- (15), the following holds true: For every ∈ A and every mapping h A
Proof. Two cases may be distinguished. Case 1. There exists ∈ A such that h
. Let 
and letting k = h k . By the assumption of this case, the set appearing in square brackets in (19) has at most 45 elements, and therefore the union in (19) has at most 225 elements. Because we are assuming that m ≥ 453, we have A − = m − 1 /2 ≥ 226, and therefore the choice indicated in (19) is feasible. Now the probability in question is at least
The proof is complete by Lemma 6.3 and Remark 6.2. Now we are able to construct simple majority voting games with an odd number of players, whose Mas-Colell bargaining sets are empty. Let T = A be a tournament with m ≥ 453 that satisfies (13) Moreover, we assume that k is sufficiently large such that the following condition is satisfied. The empirical distribution of preferences in Q N is close enough to the uniform distribution that the conclusion of Lemma 6.4 holds true when prob A is replaced by this empirical distribution-that is, by the probability measure prob on L A that is determined by prob R = i ∈ N R = Q i /n for all R ∈ L A . Lemma 6.4 guarantees the existence of k.
A vector = i i∈N , i ∈ A for all i ∈ N , is a position. Let be a position and ∈ A. We say that enhances We call a position nonenhancing (at Q N ) if it does not enhance any ∈ A. If, in addition, every position ≥ , = , enhances some ∈ A, then we call maximal nonenhancing (MNE). Note that for any nonenhancing position there exists an MNE position such that ≥ . 
In other words, the new alternative that corresponds to the position is inserted just above . The internal order between new alternatives that are inserted in the same slot is immaterial. Note that, by Lemma 6.5, in the tournament associated with R N , R N (see Notation 2.1), every ∈ A beats any * ∈ A * , i.e.,
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that there is some x ∈ N V . Let y ∈ N be defined by
As y ∈ N V the position has the following properties: 7. Two models with many voters. We here present two models in which special assumptions about the distribution of preferences in the population of voters lead to existence results when there are many voters.
The first model is probabilistic. Let A be a fixed set of m alternatives, and let L = L A . We assume that each R ∈ L appears with positive probability p R > 0 in the population of potential voters, where R∈L p R = 1. Now let i i∈ be a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables such that Pr
n be the corresponding random profile of preferences for n voters, and let N V N be the random simple majority voting game that is associated via some utility representation u N R N = u i R i i∈N for each realization R N of N . We are going to prove that in this model the limiting probability, as n → , that the bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set are nonempty, equals one. We note that the analogous statement does not hold true for the core. In the case of the core, the limiting probability in question is that of the existence of a weak Condorcet winner. This has been studied quite a lot in the literature (see, e.g., Sen [19] and Gehrlein [11] ). In the simplest setup, where p R = 1/m! for every R ∈ L A , it is known that the limiting probability that there exists a weak Condorcet winner is strictly less than one for every m ≥ 3, and it tends to zero as m → . In the more general setup that we consider here, it is even possible to choose p R > 0 so that this limiting probability will equal zero (see Example 7.1 below).
Define, for j = 1 m
Regarding N V when R N is good, we distinguish two cases. If there is a weak Condorcet winner , then u N R N ∈ N V . If no such exists, then 0 ∈ N V . Thus, we see that in order to prove both parts of the theorem, it suffices to show that N is good with probability tending to one as n tends to infinity. This fact is implied by (25) applied to j = m.
As shown in the next theorem, the probability that a positive fraction of voters may receive maximal utility in the Mas-Colell bargaining set tends to one if n tends to infinity. for all i ∈ T and j = 2 k. Then Q = k − 1 T and z > y P ∩Q x Q\P . By (27), Q ≥ kn + 1 /2. Therefore, Q z is a counterobjection to P y .
By means of an example, it may be shown that replication may not guarantee nonemptiness of the AumannDavis-Maschler bargaining set. Indeed, let n = 4, A = a 1 a 4 a * 1 a * 4 b c , let R N be given by Table 7 , and let u N ∈ R N . In Peleg and Sudhölter [17] 10 it is shown that for any imputation there exists a strong objection that does not have a weak counterobjection. The proof of Theorem 3.1 in that paper proceeds by contradiction, and it
